kernel: fix CVE-2013-1763 in older kernels
Newer kernels were already fixed by upstream. Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jogo@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 36607
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								target/linux/generic/patches-3.3/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
									
									
									
									
									
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From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
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Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000
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Subject: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
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Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
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with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
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sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
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condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
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doors for a privilege escalation.
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Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
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Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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---
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--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
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+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
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@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk
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 	if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
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 		return -EINVAL;
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+	if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
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+		return -EINVAL;
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+
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 	hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
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 	if (hndl == NULL)
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 		err = -ENOENT;
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								target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
									
									
									
									
									
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								target/linux/generic/patches-3.6/090-CVE-2013-1763.patch
									
									
									
									
									
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From 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
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Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 01:13:47 +0000
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Subject: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
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Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
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with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
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sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
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condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
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doors for a privilege escalation.
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Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
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Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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---
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--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
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+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
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@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk
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 	if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
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 		return -EINVAL;
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+	if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
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+		return -EINVAL;
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+
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 	hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
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 	if (hndl == NULL)
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 		err = -ENOENT;
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