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				git://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/openwrt.git
				synced 2025-10-31 14:04:26 -04:00 
			
		
		
		
	This fixes the following security problems: * In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle attack on TLS 1.3 clients. * Denial of service attack on TLS 1.3 servers from repetitively sending ChangeCipherSpecs messages. (CVE-2020-12457) * Potential cache timing attacks on public key operations in builds that are not using SP (single precision). (CVE-2020-15309) * When using SGX with EC scalar multiplication the possibility of side- channel attacks are present. * Leak of private key in the case that PEM format private keys are bundled in with PEM certificates into a single file. * During the handshake, clear application_data messages in epoch 0 are processed and returned to the application. Full changelog: https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/wolfssl-changelog/ Fix a build error on big endian systems by backporting a pull request: https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/3255 The size of the ipk increases on mips BE by 1.4% old: libwolfssl24_4.4.0-stable-2_mips_24kc.ipk: 386246 new: libwolfssl24_4.5.0-stable-1_mips_24kc.ipk: 391528 Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
		
			
				
	
	
		
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			469 B
		
	
	
	
		
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			12 lines
		
	
	
		
			469 B
		
	
	
	
		
			Diff
		
	
	
	
	
	
| --- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
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| +++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
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| @@ -2128,7 +2128,7 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
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|  #endif
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|  
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|  /* warning for not using harden build options (default with ./configure) */
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| -#ifndef WC_NO_HARDEN
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| +#if 0
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|      #if (defined(USE_FAST_MATH) && !defined(TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT)) || \
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|          (defined(HAVE_ECC) && !defined(ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT)) || \
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|          (!defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(WC_RSA_BLINDING) && !defined(HAVE_FIPS) && \
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